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ABSTRACT
A two-stage model is used to examine a landowner’s decision to use riparian buffers. First,
the farmer chooses whether to continue farming or to sell the land for development. If the
farmer continues farming, then he or she must decide whether or not to plant a buffer. If
the farmer plants a buffer, he or she must choose its type: trees or grass. Simulations of a
representative farmer determine the parameters and parameter values that affect each de-
cision. The farmer chooses to plant a buffer unless the net crop price is high or the land
rental rate is low. The choice of buffer type is affected by crop price, farm size, relative
incentive payments, relative cost share rates, and amount of deer damage.
Key Words: Agricultural land-use, Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program, envi-
ronmental policy, land-use, riparian buffers.
Targeting important and environmentally sen-
sitive land, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) introduced in Maryland in 1997 an
enhanced version of the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP), the Conservation Reserve
Enhancement Program (CREP). This new,
voluntary incentive program seeks to use ri-
parian or stream-side buffers to improve water
quality and enhance wildlife habitat in one of
the most productive watersheds in the world,
the Chesapeake Bay. In the United States, pri-
vate landowners possess 60 percent of the land
nationwide, and so understanding their deci-
sionrnaking as regards their property and con-
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servation practices is crucial to implementing
programs such as CREI? Determining under
what conditions a private landowner would es-
tablish a riparian buffer, when most of the ben-
efits would accrue to society and not to the
landowner, is important in setting the pro-
gram’s incentives and other parameters. Would
a landowner choose to plant grasses, with their
shorter time horizon, rather than trees in order
to maintain greater flexibility in replanting the
land with crops or in selling the property? Un-
derstanding the landowner’s optimization giv-
en the various parameters would also permit
better targeting of program money to those ar-
eas most in need of buffers.
This paper examines how agricultural land-
owners in Maryland are likely to respond to
changes in program parameters in the new
Conservation Reserve Enhanced Program. A
discrete decision approach for participating or
not participating is used, followed by the land-
owner’s optimization of buffer type and size.
A further decision is added to the model due















Figure 1. Decision Tree
urbanizing nature of Maryland counties. Land-
owners also decide whether to keep their acre-
age in agriculture or sell it for development.
Because Maryland’s CREP is the first attempt
at an enhanced version of CRP, its success or
failure will provide an example for other
states.
Since the 1970s, more than 400 papers
have been published describing various as-
pects of the nutrient-buffer-water interface,
[Correll). Discussion of a buffer’s physical and
chemical processes can be found in these pub-
lications. Buffers are created with trees,
shrubs, and plants. They filter, transform, and
absorb agricultural nutrient runoff to improve
water quality, removing 50–85 percent of the
nitrogen and phosphorus as well as other ag-
ricultural chemicals from the water before it
enters the stream. Few of these papers exam-
ine the landowner’s incentives or disincentives
for planting these vegetative buffers.
Different approaches have been used to ex-
amine landowner adoption behavior for other
conservation practices. Using survey data,
several authors have examined the determi-
nants of farmers removing land from produc-
tion in exchange for incentive payments. Kon-
yar and Osbom use a discrete-choice approach
to predict participation in CN, which provides
rental payments that are based on farmers’
bids to retire cropland. Using regional data for
the entire U.S., they found that farmers’ age,
farm size, land value, erosion rate, tenure sys-
tem (rental or ownership), percentage of in-
come from farming, and expected net returns
all influenced the probabilityy of participation.
Hagan found that gross income from farming
and percentage of net income from farming
were important differences between partici-
pants and nonparticipants in the Maryland
Buffer Incentive Program (BIP). This program
offered a one-time $300-per-acre grant to
landowners who established riparian forest
buffers on their property. Almost 50 percent
of the participants earned less than $1000 per
year from farming. Participants also tended to
be younger, have more education, and have
fewer years of farm experience.
Using a contingent valuation approach,
Gasson and Potter found that longer-term con-
servation practices needed higher rental pay-
ments. They also found that while larger
growers said they would commit more acres
to conservation practices than smaller grow-
ers, the actual number of acres committed was
a smaller percentage of their total acreage. In
a 1997 workshop about buffer adoption orga-
nized by three of Maryland’s Eastern ShoreLynch and Brown: Landowner Decision Making about Riparian Buffers 587
Tributary Strategy Teams, landowners ex-
pressed concerns about losing productive
cropland, the increased difficulty of maneu-
vering farm equipment, the presumed in-
creased of the deer population (which in turn
would lead to increased predation along with
concurrent decreases in yield), and the money
and time required to establish and maintain the
buffers.
Our model also incorporates the landown-
er’s decision to sell or not to sell the land, to
incorporate landowner expectations about the
potential for development. Previous work by
Hansen and Schwartz found that enrollment
behavior in the California Williamson Act, a
20-year-contract preferential taxation assess-
ment program, was not independent of the
landowner’s development expectations. In
fact, the authors conclude that landowners’ ex-
pectations about their ability to achieve an ex-
ceptionally favorable sale within the time pe-
riod were overly optimistic. Landowners in
Maryland may also have overly optimistic ex-
pectations. In the Chesapeake Bay region there
are currently potentially significant financial
returns to selling farmland for development,
given the increased demand for residential
property. Population in the Chesapeake Bay
watershed grew 26 percent from 1970 to 1994.
In 1985, about 4.0 million acres of the Ches-
apeake watershed were urban or suburban.
This number is projected to increase to about
5.4 million acres by 2000, an increase of 35
percent over the 1985 acreage (Chesapeake
Bay Program). Therefore, landowners in sub-
urbanizing areas must consider whether they
would prefer to retain their land without any
constraints-constraints such as would be im-
posed by a CREP contract—in order to be able
to take advantage of an optimal sales oppor-
tunity if one should appear.
Adoption of conservation behavior is often
a two-stage process. V/Me many previous pa-
pers have focused solely on the decision of
whether or not to participate in a conservation
program, this paper examines both the decision
of whether to participate and the width and type
of buffer chosen. In addition, the analysis al-
lows for the opportunity cost of the lost agri-
cultural income and the lost option to make the
most profitable sale if the parcel restricted by
a CREP contract cannot be sold at the optimal
date. Understanding the landowner’s incentive
structure in an urbanizing environment with in-
creasing land values is important.
Conservation Reserve Enhanced Program
(cREP)
The genesis of CREP came from USDA re-
focusing its Conservation Reserve Program’s
resources to target the most important or most
environmentally sensitive lands. The program
now assigns points based on environmental
values to determine priority levels of appli-
cations. This objective led to the State En-
hancement Program (SEP), under which states
could apply for more than the usual CRP
funds in order to target environmentally sen-
sitive lands, such as the Chesapeake Bay area.
As a CRP priority area, all cropland within the
Chesapeake Bay area was eligible for enroll-
ment in CREF!
In 1996, the Chesapeake Bay Executive
Committee announced a goal of2010 miles of
forested riparian buffers by the year 2010. In
1997, Maryland and USDA implemented an
Enhanced Conservation Reserve Program
(CREP) to provide incentive payments to land-
owners who plant forest buffers and filter strips
to decrease the amount of nutrients entering the
waterways. The program seeks to enroll
100,000 acres of land, with the following spe-
cific targets: 70,000 acres of riparian buffers
(grass or trees), 10,000 acres of wetlands res-
toration, and 20,000 acres of land with an erod-
ibility index greater than 15. Because Mary-
land’s program is the first attempt at an
enhanced version of CRE its success or failure
will provide an example for other states.
CREP is different from CRP in four ways:
l It has continuous sign-ups whereas CRP had
a sign-up period; its annual rental payments
are based on soil type and county-level rents,
whereas under CRP they were based on the
bids farmers made during the sign-up period.
c In addition to annual rental rates, CREP pro-
vides incentive payments for conservation
practices, equal to 70 percent of the rental588 .Iournal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2000
Tablel. Maryland Conservation Reserve En-




Number Total Enrolled Enrolled Applica-
of Con Acres in Grass in Forest dons in
tracts Enrolled Buffers Buffers Progress
508 5,722 3,100 1,108 169
Farm Service Agency, 1998.
l
.
payment for land planted in tree buffers and
50 percent of the rental rate for land planted
in grass buffers. In essence, farmers receive
170 percent of the annual rental rate for trees
and 150 percent for grass.
CREP does not enroll the entire farm, as
does CRE but targets stream-side areas. The
average CREP contract in Maryland is for
12 acres (the 1997 average farm size was
154 acres), with buffers ranging from 35 to
150 feet wide.
The program’s final difference from the ex-
isting CRP is its easement program, which
buys an easement on the riparian area to en-
sure the buffer will continue into perpetuity.
This easement program has not yet been im-
plemented as it is still being designed, and
so is not discussed further in this paper.
Sign-ups through October 1998 for CREP
contracts, which are anywhere from 10 to 15
years long, are shown in Table 1.
Model and Simulations
A two-stage model is used that takes into ac-
count the temporal aspects of the problem and
examines an individual landowner’s profit-
maximizing decision whether to sell the land
for development or to continue crop cultiva-
tion. In the first stage of the problem farmers
make two discrete choices between land-use
options by comparing the net present value of
each. As Maryland is a rapidly urbanizing
state, farmers take into account the possibility
of selling their land for non-farm use imme-
diately (a = 1) or at some future date Y, Be-
cause of this possibility, many landowners
may not want to enroll in a fixed-term CREP
contract of, say, 15 years, but would rather
keep the flexibility of selling their land at any
time. (The contract length is assumed to be
binding because of the high penalties for
breaking the contract. Penalties include repay-
ment of all rental, incentive, and cost-share
payments, as well as any punitive fines im-
posed by USDA. No rational landowner
would enter into the contract unless he or she
planned to fulfill it.)
The farmer can choose among several
paths, each of which affects the feasible op-
tions in the next period (Figure 1). For ex-
ample, if the landowner commits to maintain-
ing a grass buffer for 15 years, he or she is
unable to sell the property in Year 8. If the
agricultural land is sold and developed, it is
assumed that the sale is an irreversible deci-
sion and no further decisions will be made.
Although CREP contracts for trees can be 10
to 15 years, the simulation results show that
the high conversion cost of taking out trees
precludes the landowner from agreeing to a
15-year contract to adopt a tree buffer. So if
the landowner chooses to enroll in a forest
buffer, the next decision-making time period
is t = 30. Consequently, each landowner is
deciding to maximize utility by choosing CY
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In equation (l), Y is the optimal year to sell
the land; participating in CREP may constrain
the possible set of Y. SP is the sales price net
of conversion costs of the irreversible decision
to sell the land for development. The annual
rental value of keeping the land in agriculture
is captured by IIZQ3),where ~ = 1 if the farm-
er joins CREP, and zero otherwise.
If crop cultivation is continued the land-
owner then decides whether it is optimal to
participate in CREF? The second decision can
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The landowner chooses ~ = 1 if partici-
pation in CREP increases expected profits, or
chooses to stay out of the program, ~ = O.
Agricultural returns, T,, depend on the number
of acres planted, where TA is the total number
of acres. FB, GB ~,and GB2 are the number of
acres planted in forest or grass buffers and the
yield per acre, which varies each year. With
respect to planting grass buffers, GB ~and GB2
are used to differentiate between the first 15
years and for the second 15 years. The per-
acre returns, n, depend on the number of acres
planted in forest and grass buffers and the
rental rate given under the CREP contract, but
do not vary by year.
Once a discrete choice has been made the
farmers shift to the second stage, that of de-
termining how wide a buffer and which type
(grass or trees) provides the greatest net pre-
sent benefits relative to planting crops. Under
CREP, participants receive greater incentive
payments and higher cost-share rates for forest
buffers. During a workshop, however, farmers
expressed a number of drawbacks they think
forest buffers have (Eastern Shore Tributary
Teams). In addition to increasing the number
of years land is out of production and delaying
the possible land sale date, farmers believe, for
example, that a forest buffer will reduce the
yield on the remaining acres. They think that
the trees will shade the fields, make it more
difficult to operate equipment, and attract
more wildlife (deer), which will in turn in-
crease predation and decrease yield (Eastern
Shore Tlibutary Teams). Therefore, a darnage
function is included to incorporate potential
deer-connected yield losses. Yield losses due
to deer are assumed to increase with acres
planted in forest buffers, D(FB). The damage
function can be expressed as D(FB), where (1
– D(FB)) is the proportion of potential har-
vest the grower realizes. Damage is assumed
to increase with additional acres of forest buff-
er but at a decreasing rate, (D’ (FB) > O;
D“(FB) < O). Each grower chooses the opti-
mal buffer type and number of acres to max-
imize profits, trading off crop acreage and
crop damage for incentive payments on the
buffered acreage. All of the crops are sold in
competitive markets, so the net price of the
crop P is exogenous to the model. Thus, the
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The production function for crops, J(A), gives
us the per-acre yield, with A being the number
of acres planted to the crop. Crop production
is assumed to increase with acreage but at a
decreasing rate. FB is the number of acres
planted to forest buffers, with @ as the annual
rental rate and W the level of the incentive
payment. GB, is the number of acres planted
to grass buffers, with the same annual rental
rate @ and an incentive payment level of q.
The fixed cost of installing and maintaining a
buffer is FC1 per acre for forest buffers and
FC2 for grass buffers. Fixed costs for instal-
ling the buffer occur only once, in Year 1. The
cost share rates are h for trees and p for grass.
The trees also earn a stumpage value of W
per acre after 30 years of growth.
The comparative static results predict that
farmers will increase both forest and grass590 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2000
buffers if rental rates increase, own-incentive
payment’s percentage increases, or the own
cost-share rate increases. If the forest buffer’s
cost-share rate increases, it is ambiguous
whether grass buffers will increase or de-
crease, and vice versa. Farmers decrease forest
buffers when net crop price per bushel increas-
es, when r (the discount rate) increases, or
when the number of acres in crops increases.
Landowners will also decrease grass buffers
when net crop price increases. These results
follow standard economic theory and are not
surprising. The interesting questions are the
different trigger levels that impact both the
discrete and the continuous decisions. The
simulation results are discussed below.
Simulations
Trigger points were determined where buffer
type changes or where farmers decide buffers
are not optimal. Interestingly, the simulations
show that if a landowner decides to participate
he or she will plant the entire permitted acre-
age in a buffer. There were no cases where the
farmer decided to plant the buffer partially in
trees and partially in grass. Given that trees
pay more but cause damage, the hypothesis
was that farmers would plant trees on some
acres to get the higher payments but not on
others because of the damage component. The
spatial aspects of the problem which may lead
to this result—i.e., landowners may decide to
plant trees next to the stream and then grass
next to the field to buffer their fields from the
deer or from shading—were not included in
the model, since doing so would require
knowing whether the stream was on the edge
of the field or ran down the center of the field.
In addition, as acreage increased farmers need-
ed to put a higher and higher percentage of
their acreage into trees before trees were de-
termined to be optimal. This contradicts the
results obtained by Gasson and Potter. Again,
the absence of any spatial element may con-
tribute to this result.
The software program “Excel” was used
to conduct simulations to determine the impact
of different parameters on the decision to plant
a forest buffer, a grass buffer, or no buffer. The
simulations were based on a representative
farm of 100 acres currently growing non-irri-
gated, conventional corn. Corn prices in
Maryland, an important poultry-producing re-
gion, ranged from $2.90 to $3.60 per bushel.
Using crop budget data for this region, the av-
erage price for a bushel of corn in this simu-
lation was $3.25. The average total cost of
corn production was $2.66 per bushel; thus,
average profit per bushel was $0.59. Assuming
$0.59 per bushel is the result of profit-maxi-
mization over fixed and variable inputs, the
base net price of $0.59 is used in the simula-
tion.
Average corn yields in this region range
from 80 to 120 bushels per acre. Yields varied
in the simulation over the years of the CREP
contract. To do this the random number gen-
erator in the Excel spreadsheet was used to
pick each year’s yield from a range of 80 to
120 bushels per acre. Maryland farmers
around the state suffer losses in yield from
deer browsing on crops. In 1996, nearly 92
percent of farmers indicated that they suffered
deer damage. Statewide, farmers lost on av-
erage 5 to 13 percent of harvested yield, for
an estimated loss of almost $38 million
(McNew and Curtis). An average yield loss of
6 percent was assumed in an exponential dama-
ge function where damage increases with the
number of acres planted to a forest buffer. A
grass riparian buffer was assumed to result in
no additional deer damage.
Given that a maximum of 150 feet from
the edge of the stream is eligible for a CREP
contract, a farmer was assumed to be eligible
to enroll no more than 10 percent of his or her
acreage into CREP. Thus the representative
farmer was constrained to enrolling a maxi-
mum of 10 acres into the buffer program. The
soil rental rate in Maryland ranges by county
from $30 per acre to $88 per acre. For the base
case, an annual per-acre soil rental rate of $70
was used. This rate of payment corresponds to
soil types that would produce the range of
yields mentioned above. The current incentive
payment levels are 50 percent of the rental rate
for grass and 70 percent for tree buffers. To
install and maintain a riparian forest buffer
costs approximately $575 per acre and a grassLynch and Brown: Landowner Decision Making about Riparian Bu@ers 591
Table 2. Optimal Land-Use Choice Based on Land Value and Contract Length
Land Price Optimal Year to Sell Optimal Year to Sell
per acre if unconstrained by if constrained b~” Optimal Land Use Choice:




















































Forest Buffer for 30 years
Forest Buffer for 30 years
Forest Buffer for 30 years
Forest Buffer for 30 years
Forest Buffer for 30 years
Forest Buffer for 30 years
Forest Buffer for 30 years
Forest Buffer for 30 years
Forest Buffer for 30 years
Grass Buffer for 15 years
Grass Buffer for 15 years
Grass Buffer for 15 years
Grass Buffer for 15 years
Grass Buffer for 15 years
Grass Buffer for 15 years
No Buffer
No Buffer
* Based on Representative Farm: 100-Acre Corn Farm, 10 percent riparian area, Net crop price, $0.59, average yield,
100 bushels, yield loss, 6 percent, Rental rate, $70, Forest Costs, $575, Grass Costs, $400, Forest Cost-Share, 87.5
percent, Grass Cost-Share, 50 percent, Forest Incentive Payments, 70 percent, Grass Incentive Payments, 50 percent,
discount rate, 4 percent, Stumpage, $800.
buffer costs $400 per acre (Memo From
USDWNRCS on Flat Rates). Farmers can re-
ceive cost-share payments for the installation
of either of these buffers. The current cost-
share rate for a grass buffer is 50 percent. The
broader array of habitat and water quality ben-
efits provided by a forest buffer are reflected
in the higher soil rental rate bonus payment,
as well as in the higher cost-share rate of 87.5
percent.
At the end of the CREP contract period a
farmer can sell the trees that have been grown
on a forest buffer. As mentioned previously,
any farmer considering a forest buffer is going
to optimize over a longer time frame of two
contract periods, or 30 years. A managed 40-
acre site of pine that is sold for pulpwood
would return $1000 per acre at the end of 30
years. Therefore, the stumpage value of the
riparian forest buffer in Year 30 is assumed to
be $800 per acre (Templin Forestry). The cost
of harvesting the trees from a buffer are as-
sumed to be higher than on a 40-acre site. The
farmer maximizes the present value of the prof-
it received from the acreage left in agriculture
plus the rental and bonus payments for the ri-
parian buffer for 30 years. A discount rate of
4 percent is assumed.
These numbers were then used to simulate
the discrete decisions. The optimal year to sell
property was computed given an appreciation
in land value of 3.5 percent a year. A range of
land values from $2,000–10,000 per acre was
used. Several scenarios were simulated:
choose to sell immediate y (1’ = O), choose
agriculture with no buffers until the optimal
year to sell (Y > O), choose one 15-year con-
tract of grass (Y > 14), or choose a 30-year
contract of trees or a 30-year contract of grass
(Y > 29). If the optimal year to sell the prop-
erty falls before the end of the contract, the
landowner decides, based on the highest pre-
sent value, whether to enter the contract and
constrain the date of sale or to retain the op-
tion of selling at any date.
Results
Table 2 presents the results for the decision
whether to enter the program or sell one’s592 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2000
Table3. Optimal Choice of Buffer/No Buffer and Buffer Type Based on Parameters
Size of PresentValue of
Type of Buffer PresentValue of 30-year Continuous
Parameters Buffer (acres) 30-year Income($) Ag Income($)
Base Case*
Net Crop Price < $0.65 per bushel
$0.64< Net Price <$0.92 per bushel
Net Price >$0.91 per bushel
Rental Rate: $55–88 per acre
Rental Rate: $48–54 per acre
Rental Rate: $30–47 per acre
Forest Incentive Payment: 66%
Forest Incentive Payment: 65%
Forest Cost Share: 78%
Forest cost Share: 77%
Stumpage Value: $614 per acre











































































* Base case is a 100-Acre Corn Farm, 10 percent riparian area, Net crop price, $0.59, average yield, 100 bushels, yield
loss, 6%, Rental rate, $70, Forest Costs, $575, Grass Costs, $400, Forest Cost-Share, 87.5%, Grass Cost-Share, 50%,
Forest Incentive Payments, 70%, Grass Incentive Payments, 50%, discount rate, 4%, Stumpage, $800.
** Damage p~rCentage isbased Orr 10 acres being placed into ripmian forest buffer.
land. For land valued at $4500 per acre or less
the landowner would optimize by staying in
agriculture and selling in 30 years or later. For
land valued at $5000 to $6000 per acre, the
landowner’s optimal year to sell would fall be-
tween 20–28 years, or less than the 30-year
time horizon. However, the landowner would
achieve a higher present value by waiting until
year 30 to sell and putting in a 30-yertr buffer.
For property valued at $6500–9000 per acre,
the optimal time to sell would vary from 12
to 19 years. In this case the grower should
select a 15-year buffer and then sell in Year
15 or later. When the land was valued at
$9500–10,000 per acre the growers would not
enter into a contract but would maintain their
option to sell in the optimal year.
In the case of the second decision, to par-
ticipate in the program or not participate,
farmers would refrain from entering a CREP
contract in only two cases: when net crop pric-
es per bushel were very high (>$0.91 ) and
when rental rates were very low (<$48.00).
Therefore, Table 3 incorporates these results
on participation in the program from the sim-
ulations as well as describing the buffer selec-
tion and size decision. In the base case simu-
lation the farmer chooses to enroll 10 acres in
riparian forest buffer for 30 years, for a total
present value of profit of $115,162. This in-
cludes the profits from crops, the soil rental
rate plus bonus payment, the cost-share for
tree planting, and the 30-year stumpage value
of the forest buffer, as well as accounting for
the increase in crop damage from deer.
If the per-bushel profit for the corn crop is
less than $0.65, the farmer chooses the forest
buffer, When the net price is less than $0.92
but greater than $0.64, the farmer chooses the
grass buffer. If the per-bushel profit for the
corn crop is greater than $0.91, the farmer
chooses to plant no buffer—to not enroll in
CREF? Farmers would plant forest buffers if
net crop prices were $1.25 per bushel or less,
if deer-caused yield loss was not connected to
the forest buffers.Lynch and Brown: Landowner Decision Making about Riparian Buffers 593
The simulation also demonstrated that the
size of the farm matters because of the nega-
tive impact of the additional deer damage to
the crops. A farm of 100 acres is the largest
that would install a riparian forest buffer when
deer damage is a problem. A farmer with as
few as 10 acres would choose to enroll 10 per-
cent in the forest buffer program. Large farms
(up to 100,000 acres in the simulation) would
install the maximum 10 percent of acreage in
a grass buffer. If the acreage constraint were
relaxed, a farm of 150 acres would plant trees
only if they were allowed to plant at least 53
acres. Similarly, a 200-acre farm would plant
trees only if 103 acres were permitted. Thus
as farm size increases tree buffers are planted
only if the number of acres permitted is an
increasing percentage of the total acreage. Op-
tions from 10 percent to 35 percent to 52 per-
cent were simulated. Trees can be very prof-
itable, but this profitability has to be compared
to the lower yield farmers perceive will ac-
company tree buffers. Profitability on large
farms is enhanced with a large number of
trees. In such a case each additional acre of
forest buffer contributes marginally less to the
yield decrease; in addition, there are fewer
acres left in crops to be damaged. If the model
assumed that no addhional deer predation
would occur following the planting of the for-
est buffer, farms of all sizes from 1 to 10,000
acres would choose to plant the maximum
number of acres permitted in forest buffers.
The simulations show that at base prices,
costs, yields, and incentive levels, farmers will
enroll as many acres as possible into CREl?
The 10-percent acreage constraint was always
binding. If allowed to, the base-case farmer
would enroll all 100 acres into the riparian for-
est buffer program. The stumpage value of the
timber would be an important determinant in
deciding whether to plant trees or grass. If the
stumpage value were less than $614 per acre,
the farmer would plant a grass buffer instead
of a forest buffer. If no additional deer damage
were to occur following the planting of the
forest buffer, then a farmer would plant forest,
even if the stumpage value were $0.
The ratio of cost-share percentages would
influence the tree-versus-grass decision. The
ratio of h (tree cost-share) to p (grass cost-
share) would need to be greater than 1.54 for
the farmer to choose a forest buffer over a
grass buffer. This would correspond to a cost-
share of 77 percent for trees and 50 percent
for grass, relative to the current tree cost share
of 87.5 percent and grass cost share of 50 per-
cent. The soil rental rate bonus payment ratio,
+ (forest incentive) to q (grass incentive),
would need to be greater than 1.3 to influence
a farmer to choose trees over grass. This cor-
responds to a bonus incentive of 65 percent
for trees and 50 percent for grass, relative to
the current tree bonus of 70 percent and grass
bonus of 50 percent.
Under the simulation, different annual soil
rental rates would result in different riparian
buffer types. A payment of $30 to $47 per
acre, along with the corresponding bonus in-
centives (yields do not change from the base-
case random pattern), would result in no ri-
parian buffer contract. If the annual per-acre
soil rental rate were between $48 and $54, a
grass buffer would be installed for two 15-year
contracts. If the annual per-acre soil rental rate
were between $55 and $88, a riparian forest
buffer would be installed for 30 years. Without
deer damage, landowners would be willing to
put in forest buffers when rental payments
were as low as $30 per acre. Below that rate
no buffer would be installed.
The choice of buffer type would not de-
pend on small changes in the discount rate. Up
to an interest rate of 6.6 percent, the landown-
ers would still install a forest buffer. Only
when the discount rate was greater than 6.7
percent would the farmer choose a grass buffer
instead. The increase in crop damage caused
by deer that could possibly occur when a for-
est buffer was installed would have an impact
on the farmer’s decision to install the grass
buffer. The base-case darnage level of 6 per-
cent as a result of a forest buffer would not
deter farmers from planting 10 percent of her
acreage in trees. At a damage level of 6.7 per-
cent, the representative farmers would switch
to a grass buffer. Deer damage caused on av-
erage a 5 to 13 percent loss of harvest yield
on Maryland farms (McNew and Curtis). Thus
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cerned about attracting more deer would pos-
sibly not risk the possibility of lower yields
that could come from a forest buffer, and in-
stead would choose grass,
Conclusions
This simulation of a landowner’s decisionmak-
ing has revealed several results that may assist
policymakers in designing voluntary conser-
vation programs. By incorporating the deci-
sion whether to sell the land or remain in ag-
riculture, the analysis demonstrates how
important non-agricultural opportunity costs
are in participation decisions. If environmen-
tally sensitive but high-value land, such as in
the Chesapeake Bay watershed, is targeted for
enrollment additional incentives in addition to
the soil rental rate payments based on agri-
cultural opportunity costs may be necessary.
Landowners in urbanizing areas with land sale
prices per acre greater than $6500 may need
higher rental rates or incentive payments to be
enticed into entering the program. If the tar-
geted areas have land values greater than
$9500 per acre, much higher incentive pay-
ments would be needed to achieve enrollment
objectives. Whether the environmental bene-
fits of enrolling such high-valued agricultural
land are sufficient to justify the additional ex-
pense, or whether USDA would want to in-
corporate non-agricultural opportunity costs
into the rental payment scheme for this type
of program, remains to be determined. Current
CREP enrollment reflects lower participation
in counties with high land values and low soil
rental rates per acre.
Some policy makers have questioned
whether the 20-percent difference in incentive
payments between those for trees and those for
grass is sufficient to induce farmers to plant
trees rather than grass buffers. Farmers in the
base case would choose trees over grass if the
incentive payment ratio were at least 1.31.
This provides some confirmation that the ex-
isting program parameters should be sufficient
to encourage tree buffers. Farmers were more
likely to shift buffer types from trees for 30
years to grass for 15 years as the potential land
sale price and land sale date changed than
when the relative incentive payments changed.
Up-front costs for adoption were important
in landowner decision making. Farmers were
more sensitive to the relative cost-share rates
between grass and trees than to relative incen-
tive rates. Since trees are more expensive to
install and maintain, growers needed a cost-
share ratio of 1.56 to select trees rather than
grass. Since at this time Maryland landowners
can get cost-share payments of up to 100 per-
cent of the costs in many cases (from addi-
tional payments made by Ducks Unlimited or
by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation), they
should not be deterred from planting trees.
This result suggests that increasing cost-share
rates may be more effective than increasing
rental rates. In addition, programs such as
CREP may find that dollar-for-dollar signing
bonuses paid up front encourage more partic-
ipation than do annual rental payment increas-
es.
Interestingly enough, the perceived damage
from deer to the crops from tree buffers does
not impact the decision to plant at the average
yields or at the average net price in Maryland
for a 100-acre farm. As acreage increases,
though, the permitted percentage of acres that
could be planted to buffers become a con-
straint to choosing tree buffers. In addition, as
net crop price increases, deer damage shifts
landowners to a grass buffer. At the average
net price per bushel, farmers find tree buffers
the optimal decision. If the net price per bush-
el increases by an amount ranging from $0.06
to $0.32, grass buffers are prefen-ed because
of the crop darnage caused by a tree buffer.
Only after the net price has increased by at
least $0.33 to more than $0.91 will the land-
owner determine that the land is more profit-
able in corn instead of as a buffer. Program
administrators may need to increase incentive
rates in priority areas to encourage tree buffer
participation when deer numbers are high and
crop darnage likely.
Similarly, if the annual rental rate is less
than $48 per acre, landowners will not partic-
ipate in the program. Only when the rental rate
increases to $55 per acre will the farmer
choose tree buffers. Given the available incen-Lynch and Brown: Landowner Decision Making about Riparian Buffers 595
tives, landowners in counties where land pric-
es are less than $6000 per acre should be sign-
ing up for the program. If annual rental rates
cannot be adjusted, incentive bonus payments
may be necessary in counties with lower rental
rates to enroll landowners.
Maryland farmers are signing up in larger
numbers for grass than tree buffers (Table 1).
One explanation is that they want more flexi-
bility to sell or to convert the buffer. Or it
could be that deer predation is a real concern
for these landowners. The simulation results
suggest that land values, rental rates, and crop
prices are the three elements that affect the
participation decisions. The program should
be able to achieve high enrollment levels in
areas with low land values and high soil rental
rate. If certain areas of the Chesapeake Wa-
tershed fit these criteria and will provide en-
vironmental benefits, program money and per-
sonnel should target them. If on the other hand
areas with high land values or low rental rates
are desired, additional incentives such as high-
er annual incentive rates or signing bonuses
may be needed to achieve enrollment goals. If
deer predation is a concern to farmers, tree
buffers may be chosen only if the relative in-
centive for them is sufficiently high relative to
grass. For the average Maryland corn farmers,
the existing relative incentive and cost-share
rates should be sufficient for them to choose
tree buffers over grass buffers. As the average
acreage per farm increases, as it is doing on
the Eastern Shore, or as rental rates decrease,
as they are in Southern Maryland, the existing
program parameters may result in adoption of
a grass buffer or in no participation.
References
Applied Research Systems, Inc. Qualitative evalu-
ation of the continuous sign-up program: re-
sults offive focus groups. Prepared for the Nat-
ural Resource Conservation Service, Madison,
Wisconsin, 1996.
Chambers, Robert G. and William E. Foster. “Par-
ticipation in the farmer-owned reserve program:
a discrete choice model. ” American Journal of
Agricultural Economics 65, 1(1983): 120–124.
Correll, David L. Buffer zones and water quality pro-
tection: general principles. Paper presented at Ri-
parian buffer systems: a training program for re-
source managers, Wye Mills, Maryland, 1997.
Day, Rick L., Paul L. Richards, and Robert L.
Brooks. Chesapeake Bay riparian forest buffer
inventory: jinal report. The Pemsylvania State
University. 1996.
Eastern Shore Tributary Teams: Upper Eastern
Shore, Choptank, Lower Eastern Shore. Ripar-
ian forest buffers: Values and challenges for the
eastern shore. Summary report of eastern shore
tributary strategy teams’ workshop, Maryland,
1997.
Gasson, R., and C. Potter, “Conservation Through
Land Diversion: A Survey of Farmers’ Atti-
tudes. ” Journal of Agricultural Economics
39,3(1988):340-35 1.
Hagan, Patrick Thomas. Evaluating determinants of
participation in voluntary riparian buffer pro-
grams: a case study of Maryland’s buffer in-
centive program. Master’s thesis. University of
Maryland, 1996.
Hansen, D.E., and S.1. Schwartz. “Landowner be-
havior at the rural urban fringe in response to
preferential property taxation. ” Land Econom-
ics 51(1975):341–354.
Johnson, Phillip N., Sukant K, Misra, and R. Terry
Ervin. “A qualitative choice analysis of factors
influencing post-CRP land use decisions. ”
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics
29,1(1997):163–173.
Konyar, Kazim and C. Tim Osbom. “A national-
level economic analysis of conservation reserve
program participation: a discrete choice ap-
proach.” Journal of Agricultural Economic Re-
search 42,2(1990):5–12.
McNew, Kevin and John Curtis. “Maryland farm-
ers lose bucks on deer-damaged crops. ” Eco-
nomic Viewpoints 2,2( 1997) College Park,
Maryland: Department of Agricultural and Re-
source Economics, Cooperative Extension Ser-
vice, University of Maryland.
State of the Chesapeake Bay, 1995: Land use, pop-
ulation, and pollution. Annapolis, Maryland:
Chesapeake Bay Program, 1997.
Templin Forestry. “Consulting foresters—a breed
apart. ” The Lundowner Leader. 4,2(1993).
http: //www.templinforestry .com/vol4nol .hlm.
Venkatarao, Nagubadi, Kevin T. McNamara, Wil-
liam L. Hoover, and Walter L. Mills, Jr. “Pro-
gram participation behavior of nonindustrial
forest landowners: a probit analysis,” Journal
of Agricultural and App{ied Economics
28,2(1996):323–336.
United States Department of Agriculture Natural
Resource Conservation Service, Memo to Ed596 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 2000
Sanders of Maryland Department of Agriculture United States Department of Agriculture Natural
from Livia Marques-Cooper of NRCS, RE: Flat Resource Conservation Service-Maryland,
Rates for Practice Standard 327 Under SEP, Maryland Conservation Reserve Enhancement
October 14, 1997. Program, September 1998,